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Abstract 
We analyze the monthly forecasts for annual US GDP growth, CPI inflation rate and the 
unemployment rate delivered by forty professional forecasters collected in the Consensus database 
for 2000M01-2014M12. To understand why some forecasters are better than others, we create 
simple benchmark model-based forecasts. Evaluating the individual forecasts against the model 
forecasts is informative for how the professional forecasters behave. Next, we link this behavior 
to forecast performance. We find that forecasters who impose proper judgment to model-based 
forecasts also have highest forecast accuracy, and hence, they do not perform best just by luck. 
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1. Introduction 
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 We evaluate the quality of individual forecasts from Consensus Economics Inc., where the 
forecasts concern growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the inflation rate (CPI-based) and the 
unemployment rate, all for the USA. These forecasts have been analyzed before in various studies. 
An example is Isiklar and Lahiri (2007) who analyze the quality of the forecasts over various 
horizons. Batchelor (2007) examines the bias in the forecasts, while Dovern and Weisser (2011) 
additionally look at accuracy and efficiency of the individual forecasts. As the Consensus forecasts 
are usually created each month for next year’s economic entity, Isiklar, Lahiri and Loungani (2006) 
examine forecast revisions, whereas Batchelor (2001) and Loungani (2001) consider various other 
features of the professional forecasts from Consensus.  
 In this paper we also zoom in on the properties of the individual Consensus forecasters, 
and our angle is that we want to understand what it is what these forecasters actually do and why 
some individual forecasters perform better than others. Indeed, although we do have forecasts and 
realizations, we are usually unaware of what it could be that these forecasters do when they create 
their forecasts. So, could more forecast accuracy just be a lucky draw? Or, can we discern strategies 
that lead to better performance. One recent study that aims at related aspects is the study of Frenkel, 
Ruelke and Zimmermann (2013), where it is analyzed if forecasters intentionally deviate from 
forecasts from the IMF or OECD once these become available. Here, we focus on something 
similar, with one key difference. As we do not know how exactly IMF or OECD forecasts 
themselves are created, which also allows for the possibility that the IMF and OECD forecasters 
in turn look at past Consensus forecasts, we decide to create our own benchmark model-based 
forecasts ourselves. These benchmark forecasts are based on simple time series averages, and with 
these we can assume that the observed individual Consensus forecasts are so-called expert-
adjusted forecasts. Indeed, the benchmark forecasts are simple moving averages of the most recent 
and available realizations of GDP growth, inflation and unemployment, and so it is reasonably 
safe to assume that any forecaster could have used these as a benchmark model forecast too. When 
we interpret the individual Consensus forecasts as expert-adjusted forecasts, we can now draw on 
various findings in the recent literature on expert-adjusted forecasts. Franses (2014) summarizes 
various theoretical results on how optimal expert-adjusted forecasts could look like. With these, 
we can assign behavioral aspects to the Consensus forecasters, and in a next step we correlate these 
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behavioral features with actual performance. This latter correlation thus allows us to examine why 
some forecasters do better than others, and if good or poor performance is just luck or bad luck.  
 The outline of our paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the accuracy of the individual 
Consensus forecasts relative to each other and relative to the simple benchmarks. The main 
conclusion here is that there is quite some variation in performance. Note that this is not necessarily 
a bad sign, see Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), Lahiri and Sheng (2010), and recently Legerstee 
and Franses (2015) who show that also disagreement can have predictive value. In Section 3 we 
create indicators of the behavior of the professional forecasters, and we correlate these indicators 
with their individual forecast accuracy. In Section 4 we provide various conclusions, and we also 
suggest avenues for further research.  
 
2. The forecasts and their accuracy 
 
We collect the forecasts for yearly values of GDP growth, the inflation rate and the unemployment 
rate from Consensus Economics Inc. We have forecasts created in the months of 2000M01 to and 
including 2013M12, and we have realizations of the annual data for 2001 to 2014 (retrieved May 
2015). The maximum number of monthly forecasts is thus 14 times 12 is 168. Each forecast can 
be viewed as an update, but in this paper we do not focus on forecast revisions, but merely we 
compare the monthly forecasts for next year’s economic entity with its actual realization in that 
particular year. Later we will create benchmark model-based forecasts.  
 
Forty professional forecasters 
 
First, we focus on the professional forecasters in our sample. Table 1 reports their names or 
institutions and the number of forecasts they have provided in the sample period of interest. DuPont 
gave forecasts in all 168 months, while we decide to include Mortgage Bankers Assoc. with their 
36 forecasts as a minimum of three years of data. Below we will need these 36 observations in 
regression models, and hence we do not include other forecasters with smaller amounts of 
forecasts. It should be stressed that not all provided forecasts concern connected observations, and 
for many of the 40 forecasters there are gaps in their reporting. Figure 1 shows a histogram of the 
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data in Table 1, and clearly there is quite some variation in inclusion in each month’s panel of 
forecasts. This implies that the average Consensus forecast that is so often used rarely concerns an 
average of the quotes of the very same professional forecasters. This is not necessarily a bad sign, 
it is just a fact.  
 In Table 2 we present the accuracy of the forecasts for the three variables where we rely 
on four criteria. These criteria are the Mean Squared Error (MSE), the Root MSE, the Mean 
Absolute Error (MAE) and the Mean Absolute Scaled Error (MASE). The latter criterion1 is 
particularly advocated in Hyndman and Koehler (2006) and Franses (2016).  
 The numbers in Table 2 show that the forecasts for GDP growth can be pretty poor. On 
average the mean absolute error is 1.333, which, given the usual scale of GDP growth, is quite 
large. At the same time, the variation in the forecast quality is also substantial. The maximum 
RMSE is as large as 3.675. For inflation and unemployment the variation in accuracy is smaller 
than for GDP. Apparently, these first two variables are easier to predict than GDP growth. The 
main take-away from Table 2 is that there is substantial variation in forecast performance across 
the 40 individual forecasters.  
 Table 3 reports the top five performing forecasters. Note that the rankings for MSE and 
RMSE are necessarily the same, and this of course also holds for MAE and MASE. Across the 
criteria, we see similar rankings for each variable. In contrast, across the three variables we see 
different top five rankings.  Hence, forecasters with high accuracy for GDP growth do not 
necessarily perform well for the other two variables, and the other way around. 
 The forecasters rated in Table 3 seem to appear in the bottom end of Table 1, thereby 
suggesting that those forecasters who only quote a small amount of forecasts could perform better. 
To see if there might be an overall connection between the number of quotes and accuracy, 
consider for example Figure 2. Here we present a scatter of the MSE for GDP forecasts against the 
number of quotes, and clearly there does not seem much of a correlation. For the other accuracy 
measures and the other variables we get similar scatters. Below we will examine if other indicators 
of behavior can perhaps better explain forecast performance.  
Benchmark forecasts  
1 The key feature of MASE is the absolute scaled error � 𝜀𝜀�𝑡𝑡1
𝑇𝑇
∑ |𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1|𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=2 �, where 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡is the forecast 
error, T is the size of the sample containing the forecasts, and 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡is the time series of interest.  
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 We now turn to the creation of a model-based benchmark forecast. This forecast should potentially 
be publicly available to each of the professional forecasters. Hence, basically, it should therefore 
be a simple summary of the most recent publicly available observations on the variables of interest. 
As we often see in practice that the no-change forecast (sometimes called the random walk 
forecast) is hard to beat, we decide to employ the average value of the three most recent 
observations in the monthly data. For inflation and the unemployment rate, these observations are 
indeed available at the monthly level, whereas for GDP growth only quarterly data are available. 
This means that for each month t and variable 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, we consider the forecast for the next year as 
1
3
(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−3). When the data are quarterly, we use for the lagged 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 those data that are 
available at that time. Naturally, this model-based forecast can be improved along many 
dimensions, for example by including the past of the other two variables, and by including even 
many more other economic indicators. However, in all those cases, subjective judgments have to 
be made by the professional forecasters or by an analyst, and as such, by just taking an average of 
the last three months, we can assume that all forecasters could have equally used this “model-
based” forecast as their input for their own forecast. Now, given the availability of a model-based 
forecast, we can thus interpret the professional forecasts as expert-adjusted forecasts, and we can 
use various metrics of the differences between the model-based forecasts and the expert-adjusted 
forecasts as indicators of individual behavior.  
 Before we turn to those indicators of behavior, we first provide some accuracy measures 
of the benchmark forecasts in Table 4. Not surprisingly, the quality of the three-months average 
forecast is not very good, for none of the three variables of interest. In particular for CPI inflation 
the benchmark performs worse than any of the 40 forecasters. 
 In Table 5 we report the relative scores of the accuracy measures, that is, we divide for 
example the MSE of each of the forecasters by the MSE of the benchmark model, and then take 
the average. A score of 1 signals that they are equally good, while a score below 1 means that the 
professional forecasters are more accurate. From Table 5 we learn that in many cases the no-change 
forecast is beaten by the professionals, but we also see that for various forecasters the score is 
larger than 1. So, there are forecasters who do worse than the very simple benchmark. Most 
improvement is observed for the inflation rate, whereas for GDP growth and unemployment rate 
5 
 
the average score values are around 0.6, meaning that the professional forecasters on average 
provide an improvement of 40% in forecast accuracy, over the simple benchmark. 
 
3. What makes forecasters to perform well? 
 
With the introduction of a benchmark model-based forecast, it is now possible to operationalize 
various potential indicators of behavior of the forecasters. Franses (2014) summarizes several of 
these indicators, and based on theoretical and empirical evidence, it is now also possible to 
speculate if higher or lower values of those indicators could associate with more or less forecast 
accuracy. 
 
Behavioral indicators 
 
To start, when we denote the model-based forecast as MF and the expert-adjusted forecast as EF, 
we can create the variable EF-MF. For this variable we can compute the average value and the 
standard deviation. The literature on expert-adjusted forecasts seems to suggest that the ideal 
situation is that on average EF-MF should be around zero, or at least, that EF-MF is not persistently 
positive or negative. If that would be the case, then the model-based forecasts could have been 
perceived by the professionals as biased. Or, the expert could have an alternative loss function, 
which he or she takes aboard in the modification of the model forecasts. Typically, small-sized 
deviations from the model-based forecasts seem to lead to more accuracy of the end forecast than 
very large sized adjustments, although also other results exist, see Fildes et al. (2009).   
 One way to understand the situation when an expert is adjusting a model-based forecast is 
that the expert apparently has advance knowledge about an upcoming forecast error that is about 
to be made by the model forecast. So, some information about that future forecast error is part of 
the expert knowledge. It is easily understood that the optimal situation is that forecast errors are 
uncorrelated. Indeed, if an expert each and every time has to adjust the model-based forecast, and 
if these adjustments are correlated, then the model apparently is inappropriate or the expert is 
overdoing it for some reason. So, we calculate for our professional forecasters the first order 
autocorrelation of EF-MF, to be called 𝜌𝜌1, and we propose that the smaller it is the better is the 
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forecast performance. Naturally, this holds for the case where the model forecast is quite accurate. 
When the model is not adequate, it may make sense to have a larger value of 𝜌𝜌1. 
 The empirical literature summarized in Franses (2014) shows that in much practice there 
is a tendency to adjust more upwards than downwards. And, such a tendency into one direction is 
also found to lead to less accurate expert-adjusted forecasts. So, we count the fraction of months 
in which EF-MF is positive, and conjecture that deviations from 0.5 can have a deteriorating effect 
on the forecast performance of the professionals, in case of a well-performing model.  
 Finally, we run regressions like 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝐸𝐸 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, where we focus on the estimate 
of 𝜆𝜆. The more an accurate model-based forecast is included in the creation of the expert-adjusted 
forecast, the better, and hence the optimal value of the parameter 𝜆𝜆 is equal to 1. We will create a 
variable that measures the deviation of the estimated parameter in each case versus this optimal 
value 1.  
 Before we turn to linking our behavioral variables with actual forecast performance, we 
report some basic statistics of the behavioral variables in Table 6. The economic variable where 
the behavior of the professional forecasters seems to approximate the ideal situation is the 
unemployment rate, and thus is also the variable where the benchmark model forecast performs 
reasonably well. The fraction of cases with positive values of EF-MF is .470, and this is close to 
0.5. The average difference between EF and MF is only 0.069 and the associated standard deviation 
is 0.623. The estimated 𝜆𝜆 is 0.843, on average, which is rather close to 1. The only behavioral 
parameter that does not meet an ideal standard is the average estimate of 𝜌𝜌1, which is 0.882, which 
is very large. In words, we find for the unemployment rate that the professional forecasts associate 
well with the past three-months average forecast, although there are periods in which deviations 
are either positive or negative for a while. Note again that this can mean that the model-based 
forecasts are not that bad in the first place, which is a result that was also reported in Table 4, 
where the MAE is only as large as 0.988.  
 In contrast to the unemployment rate, Table 6 shows that for GDP growth and the inflation 
rate matters are strikingly different. The estimated 𝜆𝜆 parameters are on average quite close to 0, 
which suggests that the model-based forecasts could equally well have been ignored by the 
professional forecasters. Also, for GDP more professional forecasts exceed the model forecasts 
(indicating perhaps some optimism), whereas the inflation forecasts are more often below the 
simple benchmarks. The average difference EF-MF for GDP is quite large and mainly positive, 
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and the standard deviation is high. Not as high as for inflation though, where the average difference 
is -0.349, but the standard deviation is close to 3. For GDP growth, the differences between the 
professional forecasts and the benchmark forecasts are largely predictable from their own past. So, 
for these two variables this could mean that the professional forecasters deviate substantially from 
the simple benchmark simply because the benchmark is no good at all, and because the 
professionals have much more domain knowledge and expertise that they could usefully exploit.  
 Table 7 reinforces the findings in earlier tables that the 40 professional forecasters exercise 
a wide variation in behavior. The correlations across the explanatory behavioral variables can be 
large positive or large negative and anything in between without getting close to zero. We thus do 
not see any herding behavior or strong anti-herding behavior, implying correlations close to 1 or -
1, respectively.  
 
Does behavior predict accuracy? 
 
We now turn to the key estimation results in this paper. We have 5 behavioral variables which we 
intend to correlate with 4 forecast accuracy measures. The 5 explanatory variables associate with 
various types of behavior, and also due to their correlation, we decide to implement Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA). These components can then be given a verbal interpretation, which 
makes communication about the results a bit easier. Table 8 presents the 5 relevant eigenvalues 
and their associated cumulative variances. Evidently, for each of the economic quantities we can 
rely on 2 principal components (PC1 and PC2), as for each case only two eigenvalues exceed 1.  
 Table 9 presents the outcomes of a regression of a forecast accuracy measure on an 
intercept and the two principal components and the associated 𝑅𝑅2. We see that for GDP only PC2 
has some explanatory value for 2 of the 4 accuracy criteria across the 40 professional forecasters, 
where PC2 has a negative impact. In contrast, for the inflation rate we see that both PC1 and PC2 
are relevant, and here both parameters are positive. Finally, for unemployment rate, we see that 
only PC2 is statistically relevant, and that there the effect is positive. 
 Table 10 gives the dominant weights for the statistically significant principal components 
of Table 9. Given these dominant weights in PC2 for GDP, we can conclude that forecast accuracy 
can be improved when the forecaster substantially deviates from the model-based forecasts. The 
top 5 high scoring forecasters on this PC2 are displayed in the final column of Table 10. Comparing 
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this list with the best performing forecasters in Table 3, we recognize Barclays Capital and Bank 
of America – Merrill. This means that their positive performance is not based on just luck, but 
apparently these forecasters follow the proper strategy and implement their judgment 
appropriately.  
 For CPI-based inflation rate the first principal component can be interpreted as “large and 
mainly one-sided differences between own forecast and model forecast”, whereas PC2 is 
associated with “large variation in modifications and predictable judgment”. The parameters in 
Table 9 are both positive, so this behavior is not beneficial for forecast accuracy. A large negative 
score on these principal components thus would show that these forecasters consciously should do 
better. Comparing the names in the final column with those in the middle column of Table 3, we 
recognize IHS Global Insight, Prudential Financial, RDQ Economics, Bank One Corp and 
Mortgage Bankers Assoc. So, these professional forecasters perform better in terms of accuracy 
due to the proper balance between the use of a benchmark model and their domain specific 
expertise.  
 Finally, for the unemployment rate only PC2 is statistically relevant with a positive sign. 
The dominant weights are such that the interpretation is the same as for PC2 of inflation, and that 
is “large variation in modifications and predictable judgment”. A large negative score on this PC2 
would reveal the best forecast behavior. The professional forecasters who are the final column of 
this table as well as in the final column of Table 3 are Standard & Poor’s and Mortgage Bankers 
Assoc.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The main conclusion of this paper is that, by introducing a benchmark model forecast and assuming 
that a professional forecast is a modified version of that model forecast, we can learn why some 
forecasters do better than others. In fact, we would argue that without these assumptions we cannot 
judge if better performance is perhaps just a draw of luck. Instead, now we can see that GDP 
forecasters who deviate strongly from the benchmark model, and hence exercise much own 
judgment, do best, and this is a good sign. For inflation rate things are different. There we see that 
those forecasters who stay close to the model forecasts, who have small-sized equally positive or 
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negative judgment and who have less predictable judgment create the more accurate forecasts. For 
the unemployment rate we obtain approximately similar outcomes.  
Now, one could argue that we should have used the IMF or OECD forecasts as the 
benchmark forecasts, but unfortunately, for these forecasts we do not know the model component, 
as those final forecasts also already may contain judgment. This could then entail similar source 
of judgment, and that complicates a proper analysis. 
  We have considered only three variables for a single country, and naturally our analysis 
can be extended to more variables and more countries. At the same time, it would be interesting to 
design laboratory experiments to see how people actually behave when they receive model 
forecasts and various clues that can lead to adjustment. 
 For the professional forecasters themselves we are tempted to recommend to implement an 
own replicable model forecast, and to keep track of deviations between the final judgmental 
forecasts and this model forecast in order to learn and to improve.  
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Figure 1: Histogram of the amount of available forecasts for the 40 professional forecasters 
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Figure 2: Does a smaller amount of forecasts correlate with more accuracy? Evidence for GDP 
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Table 1: The professional forecasters included in Consensus Economics Inc. and the number of 
forecasts available in our sample (2000M01-2013M12) 
 
Forecasters 
Number of  forecasts 
GDP CPI UR 
DuPont 168 168 168 
Inforum - Univ of Maryland 162 162 162 
JP Morgan 162 162 162 
Eaton Corporation 157 156 157 
Nat Assn of Home Builders 153 153 153 
The Conference Board 153 153 153 
Fannie Mae 151 151 151 
General Motors 151 151 151 
Wells Capital Mgmt 149 149 149 
Goldman Sachs 148 148 148 
Univ of Michigan - RSQE 148 148 148 
Ford Motor Corp 146 143 146 
Oxford Economics 146 146 146 
Macroeconomic Advisers 144 143 143 
Morgan Stanley 142 142 142 
Georgia State University 135 135 135 
Merrill Lynch 110 110 110 
Daimler Chrysler 105 105 104 
Bank America Corp 100 100 100 
Credit Suisse 98 98 98 
Econ Intelligence Unit 98 98 97 
Swiss Re 88 88 88 
Standard & Poor's 85 85 85 
Wachovia Corp 82 82 82 
Lehman Brothers 80 80 80 
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Northern Trust 70 70 70 
Global Insight 63 63 63 
Bear Stearns 60 59 59 
United States Trust 58 57 56 
Economy.com 56 56 56 
Wells Fargo 53 53 53 
First Trust Advisors 51 51 51 
Moody's Economy.com 49 49 49 
Barclays Capital 48 48 48 
IHS Global Insight 47 47 47 
Prudential Financial 44 44 44 
RDQ Economics 43 43 43 
Bank of America - Merrill 42 42 42 
Bank One Corp 37 35 37 
Mortgage Bankers Assoc 36 36 36 
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Table 2: Accuracy of forecasts from 40 forecasters, based on four different accuracy measures 
 
 
   Mean  Median SD  Minimum Maximum 
 GDP 
MSE   3.874  4.091  2.362  0.621  13.508  
RMSE   1.878  2.023  0.596  0.788  3.675 
MAE   1.333  1.354  0.401  0.612  2.847 
MASE   0.770  0.782  0.232  0.353  1.645 
 
Inflation rate 
MSE   1.376  1.329  0.490  0.548  2.829 
RMSE   1.156  1.153  0.204  0.740  1.682 
MAE   0.904  0.901  0.190  0.554  1.480 
MASE   0.810  0.808  0.171  0.497  1.327 
 
Unemployment rate 
MSE   1.071  1.147  2.818  0.164  2.818 
RMSE   0.986  1.070  0.319  0.405  1.679 
MAE   0.658  0.680  0.174  0.344  1.167 
MASE   0.799  0.826  0.211  0.419  1.417 
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Table 3: Best performing forecasters 
  GDP    Inflation   Unemployment 
MSE/RMSE 
 
Rank  1 Economy.com   Prudential Financial  RDQ Economics 
 2 Wells Fargo   Bank One Corp  Mortgage Bankers  
3 IHS Global Insight  IHS Global Insight  United States Trust 
 4 Bank of America – Merrill Mortgage Bankers   Barclays Capital 
 5 Barclays Capital  RDQ Economics  Standard & Poor’s  
 
 
MAE/MASE 
 
Rank  1 Economy.com   Bank One Corp  United States Trust 
 2 Wells Fargo   IHS Global Insight  Barclays Capital 
 3 IHS Global Insight  Prudential Financial  RDQ Economics 
 4 Barclays Capital  Credit Suisse   Mortgage Bankers 
 5 Bank of America – Merrill Mortgage Bankers  Standard & Poor’s 
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Table 4: Benchmark forecasts and their forecast accuracy 
     
Variable  Criterion Score   
 
GDP   MSE  6.791   
   RMSE  2.606   
   MAE  2.047   
   MASE  1.183  
 
Inflation rate  MSE  8.894   
   RMSE  2.982   
   MAE  2.085   
   MASE  1.869   
 
Unemployment rate MSE  2.083   
   RMSE  1.443   
   MAE  0.988   
   MASE  1.201   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Table 5: Performance of professional forecasters relative to benchmark models, that is, we 
present the criterion value each of the forecasters divided by the relevant numbers in Table 4. 
 
 
Variable  Criterion  Mean  Median Min  Max 
 
GDP   MSE   0.501  0.602  0.091  1.989 
   RMSE   0.721  0.776  0.302  1.410 
   MAE   0.651  0.661  0.299  1.391 
   MASE   0.651  0.661  0.298  1.391 
  
Inflation  MSE   0.155  0.149  0.062  0.318 
   RMSE   0.388  0.386  0.248  0.564  
   MAE   0.434  0.432  0.266  0.710  
   MASE   0.434  0.432  0.266  0.710 
 
Unemployment MSE   0.514  0.550  0.079  1.353 
   RMSE   0.683  0.742  0.281  1.164 
   MAE   0.666  0.688  0.348  1.181 
   MASE   0.665  0.688  0.349  1.180 
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Table 6: Aspects of explanatory variables: the differences between the professional forecasts and 
the benchmark model forecasts and various properties of these differences 
 
Variable Aspect  Mean  Median  Minimum Maximum   
 
GDP Mean difference 0.984  0.913  0.207  2.588 
 SD difference   1.568  1.571  1.128  2.466 
 𝜌𝜌1   0.908  0.910  0.714  1.022 
 Fraction positive 0.678  0.669  0.366  1.000 
 𝜆𝜆  0.123  0.122  -0.061  0.344 
 
CPI Mean difference -0.349  -0.433  -1.367  1.731 
 SD difference   2.638  2.667  1.478  4.260 
 𝜌𝜌1   0.690  0.702  0.542  0.836 
 Fraction positive 0.392  0.387  0.269  0.706 
 𝜆𝜆   0.066  0.074  -0.028  0.150 
 
UR Mean difference 0.069  0.073  -0.632  0.710 
 SD difference  0.623  0.608  0.306  1.079 
 𝜌𝜌1   0.882  0.913  0.615  1.005 
 Fraction positive 0.470  0.479  0.153  0.939 
 𝜆𝜆   0.843  0.874  0.244  1.511 
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Table 7: Correlations across explanatory variables, sample size is 40 
 
Variable   GDP-CPI  GDP-UR  CPI-UR 
 
Mean difference  0.601   -0.817   -0.527 
SD difference   -0.414   -0.302   0.711 
𝜌𝜌1    -0.419   -0.224   0.618 
Fraction positive  0.930   0.774   0.817 
𝜆𝜆    0.119   0.356   0.300 
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Table 8: Results of Principal Components Analysis: the estimated eigenvalues and cumulative 
explained variance 
 
    GDP   Inflation  Unemployment 
Eigenvalues 
1    2.186   1.905   1.993 
2    1.790   1.649   1.175 
3    0.574   0.909   0.978 
4    0.318   0.363   0.613 
5    0.132   0.174   0.241 
 
 
Cumulative variance explained 
1    43.7%   38.1%   39.9% 
2    79.5%   71.1%   63.4% 
3    91.0%   89.3%   82.9% 
4    97.4%   96.5%   95.2% 
5    100%   100%   100% 
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Table 9: Regression results of a forecast accuracy criterion on an intercept and PC1 and PC2 
(white corrected standard errors), sample size is 40 
 
Variable  Criterion PC1   PC2   R-squared 
 
GDP   MSE  -0.031 (0.079) -0.173 (0.072) 0.161  
   RMSE  0.046 (0.340) -0.634 (0.259) 0.133 
   MAE  -0.006 (0.061) -0.065 (0.055) 0.048 
   MASE  -0.003 (0.035) -0.037 (0.032) 0.048 
 
Inflation  MSE  0.137 (0.048) 0.247 (0.040) 0.580 
   RMSE  0.055 (0.019) 0.103 (0.016) 0.579  
   MAE  0.072 (0.018) 0.091 (0.014) 0.663 
   MASE  0.064 (0.016) 0.082 (0.013) 0.665 
 
Unemployment MSE  0.070 (0.118) 0.259 (0.083) 0.242 
   RMSE  0.024 (0.055) 0.154 (0.042) 0.294 
   MAE  0.018 (0.035) 0.068 (0.025) 0.205 
   MASE  0.022 (0.043) 0.082 (0.031) 0.209 
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Table 10: Interpretation of statistically relevant principal components, and those forecasters who 
perform best on the final PCA-based criteria 
 
  Dominant 
Variable Weights Variables   Five highest scores 
 
GDP 
  0.584  Abs (mean differences) First Trust Advisors  
  -0.609  𝜆𝜆 − 1 -1   Barclays Capital 
        Prudential Financial 
        Bank of America - Merrill 
        Mortgage Bankers Assoc. 
Inflation 
  0.647  Abs (mean differences) Wells Capital Mgmt 
  0.628  (Fraction pos sign-0.5)^2 Wachovia Corp 
        Moody’s Economy.com 
        Barclays Capital   
        HIS Global Insight 
 
  0.646  Sd mean difference  Wells Fargo 
  0.653  𝜌𝜌1    Prudential Financial 
        RDQ Economics 
        Bank One Corp 
        Mortgage Bankers Assoc. 
Unemployment 
  0.469  Sd mean difference  Standard & Poor’s 
  0.742  𝜌𝜌1    Economy.com 
        Moody’s Economy.com 
        Bank One Corp 
        Mortgage Bankers Assoc. 
 
23 
 
References 
 
Batchelor, R.A. (2001), How useful are the forecasts of intergovernmental agencies? The IMF and 
OECD versus the consensus, Applied Economics, 33, 225-235. 
 
Batchelor, R.A. (2007), Bias in macroeconomic forecasts, International Journal of Forecasting, 
23, 189-203. 
 
Dovern, J. and J. Weisser (2011), Accuracy, unbiasedness and efficiency of professional 
macroecononomic forecasts: An empirical comparison for the G7, International Journal of 
Forecasting, 27, 452-465. 
 
Fildes, R., P. Goodwin, M. Lawrence and K. Nikopoulos (2009), Effective forecasting and 
judgmental adjustments: an empirical evaluation and strategies for improvement in supply-chain 
planning, International Journal of Forecasting, 25, 3-23.  
 
Franses, P.H. (2014), Expert Adjustments of Model Forecasts: Theory, Practice and Strategies for 
Improvement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Franses, P.H. (2016), A note on the Mean Absolute Scaled Error, International Journal of 
Forecasting, 32, 22-25. 
 
Frenkel, M. , J.-C. Ruelke, and L. Zimmermann (2013), Do private sector chase after IMF or 
OECD forecasts?, Journal of Macroeconomics, 37, 217-229. 
 
Hyndman, R.J. and A.B. Koehler (2006), Another look at measures of forecast accuracy, 
International Journal of Forecasting, 22, 679-688. 
 
Isiklar, G. and K. Lahiri (2007), How far ahead can we forecast? Evidence from cross-country 
surveys, International Journal of Forecasting, 23, 167-187. 
24 
 
 Isiklar, G., K. Lahiri and P. Loungan (2006), How quickly do forecasters incorporate news? 
Evidence from cross-country surveys, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21, 703-725.  
 
Lahiri, K. and X. Sheng (2010), Measuring forecast uncertainty by disagreement: the missing link, 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 25, 514-538. 
 
Legerstee, R. and P.H. Franses (2015), Does disagreement amongst forecasters have predictive 
value?, Journal of Forecasting, 34, 290-302. 
 
Loungani, P. (2001), How accurate are private sector forecasts? Cross-country evidence from 
consensus forecasts of output growth, International Journal of Forecasting, 17, 419-432.  
 
Zarnowitz, V. and L.A. Lambros (1987), Consensus and uncertainty in economic prediction, 
Journal of Political Economy, 95, 591-621. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
